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The paper presents the electronic wallet solution implemented within a GSM SIM 
technology for accessing public services. The solution is implemented in the medical field to 
provide information on the patient’s medical history and payment for private medical services. 
The security issue is a very important one as the patient’s history is confidential and the pay-
ment has to be safe.  
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Introduction 
The chapter presents concepts that used 
in the designed solution for the electronic 
card (wallet) used in medical services. The 
main issue is to design and implement a solu-
tion which helps the hospitals to manage the 
patient’s history information and can help in-
surance companies to do the billing with 
hospitals’ systems. The paper presents a dif-
ferent solution as the ones existing in the 
market (in Germany the most known is KVK 
– Deutsch Krankenversichertenkarte). The 
medical electronic wallet is a Java card ap-
plication (called also cardlet) which is run-
ning within the mobile SIM. The cardlet 
communicates with the “external world” via 
a Java midlet. The GSM – Global System for 
Mobile Communication includes many tech-
nologies for voice and data transmission. For 
GSM there are few distinctive types of appli-
cations: Pull typical applications (Web); Push 
typical applications (SMS/MMS); SIM Tool-
kit – Subscriber Identity Module Toolkit ap-
plications that are running in the SIM Smart 
Card using native code or Java Card technol-
ogy [3], [4], [5], [6]; Native applications 
(which are running on the top of operating 
system of the mobile device); Applications 
written in Java Micro-Edition or in C# 
for .NET Compact Framework (that are run-
ning in proper virtual machines on the mobile 
device); and Hybrid Applications. Hybrid 
Applications provide complex services such 
as SIM Sentry for Multimedia Mobile Con-
tent Digital Rights Management, Midlets 
with Java Smart Card technology solution for 
mobile banking or electronic purses, Web 
WAP applications for mobile streaming over 
RTP and RTSP in GSM networks [3], [4], [5], 
[6], [7], [8]. 
In this paper we focus on hybrid applications 
because the electronic wallet for the medical 
services is a cardlet that is running in mobile 
SIM and it communicates via a midlet appli-
cation with a desktop application using Blu-
etooth or WiFi technology. The desktop ap-
plication accesses information from distri-
buted databases using web services over se-
cure communication protocols such as SSL. 
The main concept used in GSM for end-user 
device, the mobile is a two in one computer. 
The first computer is represented by the SIM 
– Subscriber Identity Module. Actually, the 
SIM is a smart card with a microcontroller, 
three types of memory area (ROM, EE-
PROM and RAM) and I/O ports for outside 
communication (usually in half duplex mode). 
The mobile device itself is the second com-
puter. It also includes a microprocessor, dif-
ferent types of memory areas and an operat-
ing system. 
The electronic wallet that is running in GSM 
mobile SIM is a Java card application. 
 
2. Java Card Technology used for medical 
electronic wallet 
A Java card application is an applet which is 
running in smart card. But often the applet 
needs to interact with different systems and 
applications. That’s why in specialty litera-
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ture a complete application for Java smart 
card is composed from the java applet which 
is running on smart card, a host application 
and back-end application systems which pro-
vide to the end-user a service.  
With SATSA, a Java midlet can access a Ja-
va Card application using either Message-
Passing Model or JCRMI model. Our Java 
application, which is run by the mobile Java 
Micro-edition virtual machine (which is ma-
naged by the mobile device operating sys-
tem), communicates with our electronic wal-
let, which is run by the SIM Java Virtual 
Machine (which is managed by the SIM-
smart card operating system), using JSR 177 
over Message-Passing model. The communi-
cation between host application (mobile Java 
midlet) and the applets (Java smart card ap-
plication) from smart card suppose to trans-
mit some APDU – Application Protocol Data 
Unit from host to CAD – Card Acceptance 
Device, and then the same bytes strings are 
sent from the CAD to the card applet. The 
card applet (has nothing to do with Java ap-
plets which are run by Internet browsers) 
receives those bytes strings, it is parsing the 
bytes and then will send back following the 
reverse path: Applet-CAD-Host (see Figure 
2). An APDU is composed from standard 
bytes blocks conform ISO/IEC 7816-3 and 
7816-4. Respecting the standards the applet 
receives directly from CAD, APDU Com-
mands and sends back to CAD, APDU Res-
ponses. The communication between the card 
reader and the card is physically realized 
through data link protocol. This protocol is 
likely data link level protocol from protocol 
stack ISO/OSI. The link protocol, defined in 
ISO/IEC7816-4, has four alternatives: T=0 – 
byte oriented, T=1 – bytes arrays oriented, 
T=USB – oriented Universal Serial Bus or 
T=RF – radio wave oriented, Radio Frequen-
cies. The classes from Java Card API and 
JCRE specifications embed the physical de-
tails for APDU communication protocol. 
The general template for an ADPU Com-
mand is depicted in figure 2. 
There are other four specific structures for an 
APDU Command, but these structures are 
used only in data link protocol T=0. 
APDU Command 
CLA INS  P1 P2 Lc  Data  Field Le 
Header-mandatory Body-optional 
Fig.2. General structure for an APDU Com-
mand. 
 
The explication for the fields from the APDU 
command is the following: 
 CLA – is one byte – 2 hexadecimal digits, 
and has different predefined values conform 
standard ISO7816. For instance, between the 
value 0x00 and 0x19 are values for accessing 
file system and security operations, from 
0x20 to 0x7F are reserved for future using, 
and from 0x80 to 0x99 can be used for ap-
plets’ specific instructions implemented by 
developers but between 0xB0 and 0xCF are 
specific instructions for all applets and not 
for a particular one. As matter of fact the 
most used value for this field is 0x80. We use 
0x88. 
 INS – is one byte, and the standard defines 
a specific instruction in the field CLA. For 
instance, when CLA has the value between 
0x00 and 0x09, but INS has the value 0xDC 
– means card’s records update. In personal 
applications which are installed on the card, 
the field INS could have predefined values 
established by developers but according with 
the standard. For example, the developer 
chooses for this field the value 0x20 for 
checking sold amount from card if and only 
if the CLA field is 0x80; 
 P1 – this represents the first parameter for 
an instruction and it has one byte. This field 
is used when the developers want to send 
some parameters to the applet or want to 
qualify the INS field; 
 P2 – this is the second parameter for an in-
struction and it has one byte. It is used for the 
same goal like P1; 
 Lc – has one byte, it is optional and 
represents the bytes length for the field Data 
Field; 
 Data Field – is not fixed and has a bytes’ 
length equal with the value from the field’s 
value Lc. In this field data and parameters are 
stored and they are sent from host application 
to applet; 
 Le – stores the maxim number of bytes that 
should have Data Field from APDU Re-Revista Informatica Economică nr.2(46)/2008 
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sponse (the number of bytes from response 
could be any value from the range 0 and the 
value from this field). 
Practically a host application sends to the 
CAD but the CAD sends to the applet the 
same APDU commands with structures and 
values which respect the standards. 
The structure for an APDU Response is sim-
ple and is depicted in the figure 3: 
 
APDU Response 
Data Field  SW1  SW2 
Body-optional Trailer-mandatory 
Fig.3. Structure for an APDU Response. 
 
The fields’ explication for APDU Response 
is the following: 
 Data Field – has variable length which is 
determined by the value of the byte field Le 
from the APDU Command;  
 SW1 – has one byte and represent the sta-
tus word 1; 
 SW2 – has one byte and represent the sta-
tus word 2. 
The fields SW1 and SW2 are parsed and in-
terpreted together, but a communication 
process is called complete if there were no 
problems (SW1=0x61 and SW2=0x90 or 
any-0xnn) or if there were only warnings 
(SW1=0x62 or SW1=0x63 and SW2 contain 
the warning code). A communication process 
is called failed if there were execution errors 
(SW1=0x64 or SW1=0x65 and SW2 have 
the error code for execution) or checking er-
rors (SW1=from 0x67 to 0x6F and SW2 
have the code for checking error). 
A typical code of a Java midlet that commu-
nicates with the cardlet is in table 1: 
 
Table 1. A Java midlet JSR177 code 
... 
try { 
// Create an APDUConnection 
String url =  
"apdu:0;AID=A1.0.0.67.4.7.2F.3.2C.3";
byte[] commandAPDU = new 
byte[]{(byte)0x88, (byte)0x20, …}; 
//debit command 
 
APDUConnection ac = (APDUConnec-
tion)Connector.open(url); 
 
//Send a APDU command and receive a 
APDU 
//response 
byte[] responseAPDU =  
ac.exchangeAPDU(commandAPDU); 
... 
// Close connection. 
ac.close(); 
} catch(IOException e){ 
    ... 
} 
...
 
The midlet creates a JSR177 connection with 
the cardlet. The connection properties are en-
capsulated by the ac object. The APDU 
command is sent from the midlet to the card-
let using the method exchangeAPDU() of 
object ac. The life cycle of JCVM and of a 
Java Card  applet should be understood by 
anyone involved in Java smart card field. The 
life duration of JCVM is the same with that 
of the card. If the power supply of the card 
stops, the entire content of JCVM is saved in 
the persistent memory, non-volatile. Every-
thing in the internal memory-RAM-volatile 
of the card at the moment of the interruption 
of power is lost. Moreover, the objects 
created in the Java Card platform are non-
volatile, and if it is sometime intended that an 
octet string should be in the volatile memory 
because, for instance, it holds only temporary 
data, we should use the method makeTran-
sientByteArray() of the class java-
card.framework.JCSystem.  
The methods by which the applet life cycle is 
realized and that the applet should implement 
are presented in figure 4: 
 
Applet Java Card
JCRE
Card operating system
1. install()
2. register()
3. select()
4. process()
5. deselect()
 
Fig.4. Methods to be implemented by an app-
let to execute the complete life cycle 
 
Each applet is uniquely identified by an octet 
string – between 5 and 16, as defined in 
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Application ID in the standard. As well, each 
applet should extend the abstract Applet class 
and implement the methods – install(), regis-
ter(), select(), process(), deselect(), that 
represent the applet life cycle. The applet life 
cycle starts immediately after it is down-
loaded into the card and JCRE forces the ex-
ecution of the static method Applet.install() 
and at its turn the applet is registered in 
JCRE by calling the static method App-
let.register(). After the applet is installed and 
registered, it exists on the card as „not se-
lected”, the equivalent denomination being 
inactive applet. An applet is activated to 
process APDU Commands only after the host 
type application sends to JCRE by CAD an 
APDU command of type SELECT or MAN-
AGE CHANNEL. JCRE complies and noti-
fies the concerned applet by forcing the ex-
ecution of select() method which the applet 
implements. After the selection is done, all 
the APDU commands received from the host 
type application by CAD of JCRE are sent to 
the applet by forcing calling the method 
process() implemented by the applet. The life 
cycle of the applet ends when the host appli-
cation intends to select another applet for 
processing the APDU commands, moment 
when JCRE notifies the applet by forcing the 
execution of deselect() method of the applet. 
A typical code of a Java cardlet that commu-
nicates with the Java midlet is in table 2: 
 
Table 2. A Java Card code 
package 
com.sun.javacard.samples.wallet; 
import javacard.framework.*; 
public class MedicalWallet extends 
Applet { 
 
private static byte[] name = new 
byte[] {(byte)0x85, (byte)0x03, 
(byte)0x49, (byte)0x6F, (byte)0x6E};
private static byte[] surname = new 
byte[] {(byte)0x86, (byte)0x07,…} 
 
... 
//constructor 
private MedicalWallet (byte[] bAr-
ray,short bOffset,byte bLength) 
{...} 
//Life-cycle methods 
   public static void install(...) 
{...} 
   public void select() {...} 
   public void deselect() {...} 
   public void process(APDU apdu) 
{...} 
//private methods 
   private void payConsult(APDU ap-
du) {...} 
   private void sendMedRec(APDU ap-
du) {...} 
   private void verify(APDU apdu) 
{...} 
   private void getInfo(APDU apdu) 
{...} 
   private void setInfo(APDU apdu) 
{...} 
... 
}
 
Another important issue in the listing from 
table 2 is that the personal medical informa-
tion is stored in ASN.1 – Abstract Syntax 
Notation (TLV – Tag Length Value). For in-
stance, the variable name from table 2 is 
identified by tag 0x85 with 0x03 length chars. 
The chars represent the string “Ion” in ISO-
8859-1 which is the name of the medical pa-
tient.  
 
3. The Secure Electronic Card Solution for 
Medical Services 
Once we established the technical details, we 
can discuss our SECMS – Secure Electronic 
Card for Medical Services solution.  
The designed SECMS – Secure Electronic 
Card for Medical Services solution for an 
electronic wallet used in medical services 
will exploit the presented concepts in the 
previous chapters. The architecture of 
SECMS solution is presented in figure 5. In 
figure 5 the business flow is clear. The pa-
tient goes to the doctor for a medical consul-
tation. In order to have a complete view be-
fore diagnosis, the doctor may request to see 
and to update the medical records of the pa-
tient. On the patient’s mobile device are run-
ning two applications (both digitally signed 
by Health Insurance Company): the Java 
midlet on the phone and the smart card appli-
cation ‘MedicalWallet’ on the SIM. The 
communication between the ‘MedicalWallet’ 
and the Java midlet is JSR177. The medical 
record information is sent to the doctor appli-
cation only if the patient inserts the applica-Revista Informatica Economică nr.2(46)/2008 
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tion PIN. The medical record information is 
very sensitive and therefore the communica-
tion between the Java midlet and doctor ap-
plication uses SSL – TCP/IP over WiFi. Af-
ter the medical consultation the doctor appli-
cation of our solution called over HTTPS a 
web service (first implementation was XML-
RPC).  
The doctor application sends encrypted and 
authenticated SOAP – Simple Object Access 
Protocol messages (briefly described in [10]) 
which will contain: 
 the patient SIM IMSI;  
 the patient SSN – Social Security Number;  
 the patient digitally signed hash with the 
SIM RSA secret key over first two informa-
tion plus a nonce generated by the SIM;  
 the doctor IBAN and ID card number;  
 the money amount to debit.  
 
The web service called EJB from the billing 
system and send payment order via Web ser-
vices over HTTPS to the Health Insurance 
Company of the patient. The Health insur-
ance server application receives over HTTPS 
the electronic payment order from various 
billing systems. The Health Insurance Com-
pany has two powerful interconnected sys-
tems: PKI – Public Key Infrastructure system 
and the processor application of payment or-
ders called also Payment Gateway. The trans-
fer of money between the banks is not in-
cluded in SECMS goals. Because the de-
scription of each segment of communication 
in detail needs more pages, we will present 
some details of communication between pa-
tient application and doctor application. 
The communication between the patient mid-
let and doctor application is inspired in terms 
of security concept from SET – Secure Elec-
tronic Transaction [2], [4]. The communica-
tion uses dual signature concept. Dual signa-
ture is an innovative method for resolving 
the following aspect: 
 The patient needs to send the SIM IMSI 
and SSN included in “owner information” 
(OI) to the merchant and the “payment in-
formation” (PI) to the billing system; 
 Ideally, the patient does not want the bank 
to know the OI and the doctor to know PI; 
 However, PI and OI must be linked to re-
solve disputes if necessary (e.g., the patient 
can prove that the medical consultation has 
been paid); 
 
Fig.5. SECMS – Secure Electronic Card for 
Medical Services Architecture 
 
The steps for dual signatures are: 
 The message digests – using one of MD5, 
SHA-1 message digest function – of PI and 
OI are found : PIMD=MD(PI), 
OIMD=MD(OI); 
 The message digests are combined and the 
resultant message digest is found: 
POMD=MD(PIMD +OIMD); 
 POMD is encrypted by using the custom-
er’s private key to produce the dual signature: 
DS=E(POMD, Priv_key). 
 
The predicted scenario is based on: 
 The doctor application is provided with OI, 
PIMD and DS. The signature can be verified 
by computing MD(MD(OI)+PIMD); 
 The Health Insurance payment gateway is 
provided with PI, OIMD and DS. The signa-
ture can be verified by computing 
MD(MD(PI)+OIMD); 
 By using dual signature, the patient can 
provide the linkage between OI and PI; 
 
The reason for which the OI and PI are 
linked is the dual signature. The procedure 
for checking the bound established by the 
dual signature is: 
 The doctor only knows OI but not PI; 
 Payment gateway only knows PI but not OI; 
 Nevertheless if either the OI or the PI is Revista Informatica Economică nr.2(46)/2008  85
changed, the dual signature will be changed; 
 That means, OI and PI are linked together. 
 
The figure 6 is comprehensive to depict how 
a payment request by medical patient and ve-
rification by doctor application are being 
created. 
 
Encrypt 
data 
Digital 
Envelope 
PIMD 
OI 
Dual 
Signature 
Patient 
Certificate 
Request message 
Legend: 
PI = Payment Information 
OIMD =OI message digest 
POMD = PO message digest 
MD = Message Digest 
KUc = Patient’s public signature key 
Send to the Health 
Insurance payment 
gateway via doctor 
application 
II 
MD  OIMD
MD  POMD 
POMD  Decrypt 
KUc 
COMPARE
 
Fig.6. Verification process by doctor applica-
tion  
 
All the components are loosely coupled be-
cause each component of our SECMS can be 
implemented by different companies as long 
as they respect the designed specifications. 
The specifications are in draft form and we 
expect to be published in third quarter of 
2008.  
  
4. Conclusions 
The suggested secure architecture is based on 
concepts like electronic signature and en-
cryption with symmetric keys (described in 
detail by [1], [4], [5]), SSL – Secure Sockets 
Layer and IP tracking (described in [4]). 
Based on the analysis that were made in lab 
using a Nokia N95 device and a NetFront 
mobile browser it has been highlighted that 
the difference between processing time and 
access time is not significant. On average the 
process of digital signing takes at most three 
seconds. The project is still in development 
phase and the SIM application has been 
tested. This approach is developed to be ac-
cessed by a Java Micro-Edition Midlet, de-
fined by JSR177. The solution presented here 
has many advantages for medical services 
which are extended on mobile devices be-
cause it allows developing secure environ-
ments with fewer resources because every-
thing is taking place at software level and it 
doesn’t interfere with the existing infrastruc-
ture.  
Regarding the impact on mobile business so-
lutions and on mobile services, the authors 
are continuing this research in two important 
research contracts that are financed by the 
Romanian Government through two complex 
development research projects, module 
MATNANTECH (Materials and Nanotech-
nologies) and module AMCSIT of Romanian 
Excellence Research Program.  
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